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5.1  Introduction 
Inequality in Brazil has shown extreme oscillations in short periods of time. 
The benefits from growth in the 1960s went disproportionately to the rich, and 
the costs of the 1980s stagnation fell disproportionately on the poor. The in- 
come of the richest 10% of the active population divided by the income of the 
poorest 10% of the population increased from a factor of 22 in 1960, to 40 in 
1970,41 in 1980, and 80 in 1989. It declined in 1991  .I 
This paper studies the oscillations of  income distribution in  Brazil during 
the 1980s. Using monthly data for the six largest metropolitan areas, it claims 
that inequality responded to megainflation and the sharp oscillations in em- 
ployment. As opposed to what happened in the 1960s, education cannot ex- 
plain the change in inequality in the 1980s. 
Economists agree that behind the vast inequality of income distribution in 
Brazil lies an extremely unequal education distribution. Barros et al. (1992) 
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1. These numbers are calculated from the annual household surveys called Pesquisa Nacional 
de Domicilios and do not cover the same universe as the monthly employment surveys called 
Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego (PMEs), which are used in this paper. The PMEs show that the 
income of the richest 10% of the active population in the metropolitan areas divided by the income 
of the poorest  10% of the population, after peaking in mid-1990, was declining during  1991. It 
averaged a factor of 72 during the last quarter of  1991. 
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show that, if all wage differentials by education level were eliminated, the in- 
equality in labor income in Brazil would be reduced by almost 50%.’ 
But even if  we believe that education plays a major role in explaining in- 
equality, we do not want to attribute the big deterioration of distribution that 
occurred from 1987 to 1989 to changes in the distribution of education. The 
poor do not lose their skills so fast, nor do the rich acquire in  such a short 
period of time the education that transforms them into productivity prodigies. 
On the other hand, recessions and megainflations do play a role in explaining 
exacerbated income inequality. 
Over the past decade, inequality in Brazil has shown only a minor change 
in trend but extreme short-run variations  (fig. 5.1). The contribution of this 
paper is to decompose inequality into two components: inequality within and 
between groups with the same number of years of schooling. Our objective 
is to identify macroeconomics  as an important explanation for the short-run 
variations. Specifically, we offer two conclusions: inflation promotes increased 
inequality and unemployment increases inequality. 
These conclusions do not surprise, but they have not been formally docu- 
mented before nor has their extreme effect, as shown in figure 5.1, been noted. 
Needless to say, on the evidence shown here, anyone concerned with inequality 
would  focus  on  macroeconomic  stability as  a central  policy  for increased 
equality. 
A recession worsens income distribution because of its effect on employ- 
ment. In a recession, unskilled workers are the first to lose their jobs, as firms 
hoard the trained labor force. In the recovery, unskilled workers get back their 
jobs, and inequality diminishes. One must also take into account the fact that 
a recession has lasting effects on income distribution. During the recession the 
middle-class groups sell their assets to smooth consumption, assets that they 
might not be able to earn back during a recovery. 
Figure 5.2 shows the recession of 1983-84  and the decline in real income 
during 1989-91.  Add to the recession all the failed stabilization programs and 
observe that the poor have little room to cope with the radical policy moves 
that produce sectoral dislocation of resources and employment. 
Figure 5.3 shows inflation during the 1980s. Inflation can increase inequality 
in three ways. First,  if  high wages benefit from more perfect indexation, in- 
equality increases. The empirical evidence shows that perfect indexation does 
not exist and that all labor groups suffer real losses during episodes of high 
inflation. This paper also shows that in Brazil the group with five to eight years 
of education lost more than other groups in the 1980s. 
Second, the inflation tax reduces disposable income. Although the inflation 
tax does not affect those individuals below the poverty line due to their negligi- 
ble  average cash holdings,  it may  wipe out the  savings of  the middle class 
2. See Paes de Barros and Reis (1989); Sedlacek and Paes de Barros (1989); Lauro Rarnos 
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Fig. 5.1  Temporal evolution of inequality in Brazil, 198291 
Note: Twelve-month moving averages for six metropolitan areas of the Theil indices 
for total, within, and between educational groups inequality. 
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Fig. 5.2  Real income, Brazil, 198291 
Note: Average for six metropolitan areas. 
and increase the number of poor. In this sense it increases poverty and widens 
inequality of income (see Cardoso 1992). 
Third, inflation will redistribute assets in favor of the group better able to 
play the financial markets. Inflation is difficult to predict, and nominal interest 
rates may fail to reflect changing inflation rates. As a result there will be trans- 154  Eliana Cardoso, Ricardo Paes de Barros, and Andre Urani 
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Fig. 5.3 
Note: Three-month moving average; percentage per month. 
Inflation rate, Brazil, 1985-92 
fers of wealth between creditors and debtors. This will be true of all debtors 
and creditors  linked by  indebtedness  in  the form of bonds, mortgages,  and 
sales contracts, and will also be reflected in the stock market. When inflation 
reaches  1,000%,  big  gains  and losses can be  made overnight.  The middle- 
income groups will certainly  lose compared  to the groups who have better 
information, access to expensive technical advice, and flexibility. 
The costs of inflation for wage earners also include oscillations in their real 
income. For individuals who are liquidity constrained, the significant oscilla- 
tion in their real wages means that they cannot smooth consumption or that 
their real disposable income will be eroded if they try to carry cash from one 
month to the next. 
This paper explores the impact of unemployment and inflation on Brazilian 
inequality in the 1980s. The data we use is from Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego 
(PME), a monthly employment survey conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatistica.3 These surveys do not cover money holdings and capi- 
tal gains. Our measures of inequality capture only inequality in labor earnings, 
and thus the impact of inflation that we can estimate derives from imperfect 
indexation. Further information is needed to identify the impact on inequality 
from the inflation tax and the redistribution of assets. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 sets the background with a 
3. The universe of analysis and the data are described in the appendix 155  Inflation and Unemployment as Determinants of Inequality in Brazil 
summary of  what is known about income distribution in Brazil. It also de- 
scribes the inequality measures used in the paper. Section 5.3 contains the 
empirical evidence, which is based on monthly survey data for the six largest 
metropolitan areas of Brazil between  1982 and 1991. The empirical analysis 
considers the relationship between inequality in labor income and three vari- 
ables: the inflation rate, the unemployment rate, and the income differentials 
by  educational level. The methodology and the evidence are summarized in 
section 5.4, which gives our conclusions. 
5.2  Brazilian Income Distribution 
5.2.1  Background 
In  no  country has the academic debate on growth versus equality been 
sharper than in Brazil. In the 1970s the core of the discussion was whether the 
poor benefited from growth during the 1965-74  “miracle” and whether they 
might have  done better under different policies4 Today the discussion must 
evaluate the costs of bad macroeconomics in the 1980s. 
The complexity of statistical problems surrounding income distribution data 
in Brazil is serious enough to provoke skepticism. However, a few stylized 
facts are widely accepted. 
Unequal income distribution. Brazil (with a Gini coefficient equal to 0.6 in 
1990) has one of the most unequal income distributions in the world. Social 
indicators look worse than in any other country with the same income per 
capita. Table 5.1 compares economic and social indicators in Brazil with those 
of Latin American countries with a population of more than 10 million people. 
Brazil does poorly. Although in 1990 it had the highest dollar income per cap- 
ita in the region, infant mortality was three times that of  Chile, the illiteracy 
ratio was four times that of  Argentina, and Brazilians could expect to live four 
years less than me xi can^.^ 
Regional inequality. National averages of economic and social indicators hide 
extreme disparities. Regional inequality is severe.6 For instance, the interstate 
range of income in Brazil is seven to one.’ Table 5.2 shows the range of  eco- 
nomic and social indicators for the poorest and richest regions and states. Ca- 
valcanti de Albuquerque (1991) compares the index of human development for 
4. See for instance Camargo and Giambiagi (1991); Fields (1977); Fishlow (1980); Morley 
5. For measures of poverty see Hoffmann (1989) and Ravallion and Datt (1991). 
6. See for instance Vinod (1987); Maddison and associates (1989). 
7. Interstate disparity is two to one in the United States, where Mississippi’s per capita income 
was half that of Connecticut’s in  1991 (US. Department of Commerce, Survey of Currenr Busi- 
ness, vol. 72 [4] [April 19921 table A). 
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Table 5.1  Economic and Social Indicators in Latin American Countries with More 
than 10 Million People 
~  ~  ~~  - 
GDP per  Life  Adult  Mean 
Population  Head  Gini  Population  Expectancy  Illiteracy  Years  Infant 
(million$)  ($)  (Index)  Growth  (years)  Rate  in  Mortality 

























0.625  2.2 
2.0 
0.461  1.3 
0.515  2.0 
2.3 
0.498  2.7 
I .7 
2.4 
66  19  3.9  60 
70  13  4.7  40 
71  5  8.7  31 
69  13  5.7  39 
63  15  6.4  82 
70  12  6.3  35 
72  7  7.5  20 
66 
Sources: World Bank (1992); Fiszbein and Psacharopoulos (1992); Barros et al. (1992) 
aPercentage per year between 1980 and 1989. 
bPercentage of the total population that is fifteen years old or older. 
'For  individuals twenty-five years old or older. 
"For  one thousand live births. 
Table 5.2  Economic and Social Indicators in Brazil: Poorest and Richest 







Poorest region: Northeast 
Richest region: Southeast 
Brazil 
GDP per Head  Life Expectancy  Literacy Ratio 
($ of  1988)  (years)  (%) 
594  62.6 
718  51.9 
55.9 
63.1 
3,503  67.0  90.5 
4,215  68.9  89.5 
1,005  58.8  63.5 
2,989  67.1  88.2 
2.24  1  64.9  81.1 
Source: Cavalcanti de Albuquerque (1991). 
Brazilian states with indices of other nations. Rio Grande do Sul is as advanced 
as Portugal,  South Korea, or Argentina,  while Paraiba performs as badly  as 
Kenya and worse than Bolivia. 
Destitution remains predominantly  a rural phenomenon even if the gap be- 
tween the urban and the rural living standards has declined in the last twenty 
years (table 5.3). In 1988 rural income was still 60% of urban income. 
Inequality has roots in history. In the colonial economy, rents from abundant 
natural resources were monopolized by the state and by large landlords from 157  Inflation and Unemployment as Determinants of Inequality in Brazil 
Table 5.3  Indices of Urban-Rural Disparity, Brazil, 1970-88 
Income Index  Human Development Indexa 
(urban income = 100)  (urban index = 100) 
Rural Northeast  Rural South  Rural Brazil  Rural Northeast  Rural South  Rural Brazil 
1970  30  53  37  39  71  52 
1980  47  70  53  55  83  64 
1988  52  78  60  64  84  69 
Source: Cavalcanti de Albuquerque (1991) 
Portugal. The labor force was slaves. After the abolition of slavery, there was 
no land reform. Official policy kept labor cheap and uneducated. 
Poorly managed social programs. Brazil spends as much as Korea on social 
programs, but it spends poorly. The Brazilian share of social service expendi- 
ture by  government in GDP is as high as or even higher  than that of  other 
middle-income  developing countries,  but  Brazilian  social welfare indicators 
are strikingly low. 
The reasons for such an unsatisfactory social performance are twofold: pub- 
lic resources are poorly managed and are not efficiently targeted. The poorest 
19% of  the population  (with less than one-quarter  of  a minimum wage per 
household member) receives 6% of social benefits. An estimated 78% of all 
spending on health is devoted to high-cost curative hospital services and only 
22%  to basic preventive health care, such as immunization programs, malaria 
control, and maternal and child health. In education, the government supports 
free tuition in universities although the cost of educating each university  stu- 
dent is eighteen times higher than government expenditure per student at the 
primary and secondary level combined.* 
Increasing inequality. From 1960 to 1975 the degree of inequality increased 
continuously. While Fishlow (1972) emphasized the role of government policy 
in squeezing real wages, Langoni (1  973) stressed nonpolicy forces inherent in 
a situation of fast growth with a shortage of educated labor. Despite the politi- 
cal debate that surrounded the two studies, there is no necessary conflict be- 
tween the two views. The gap between rich and poor increased not only as a 
result of the increase of the real wage of  skilled labor but also because the real 
wage of unskilled  labor fell, in part as a result of the rise in inflation before 
1964 and from the mid-1960s recession, which validated the incomes policy 
of imperfect indexation. Along with this explanation, education plays a central 
8. The World Bank (1988) and Barros et al. (1992) offer analyses and critiques of  social spend- 
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role in explaining the worsening  in the distribution of income in  Brazil be- 
tween 1960 and 1975. 
The education system has a double relationship with the degree of inequality 
in income. Since the level of education is so low, educational expansion tends 
to increase the inequality in education and consequently the inequality in in- 
come. This is the composition or Kuznets effect. On the other hand, education 
expansion was considered to be too slow in comparison to the rate of economic 
growth and technological  change. As a consequence,  a relative  shortage of 
educated and skilled workers led to a widening of the wage differential be- 
tween workers with different years of schooling. 
Barros et al. (1992)  shows that two-thirds of  the increase in inequality be- 
tween 1960 and 1970 can be attributed to education. But the same paper also 
shows that education has a minor role in explaining what happened in the late 
1970s and in the first half of the 1980s.  In this paper we will show that unem- 
ployment  and  inflation  generated  the extreme oscillations in  inequality  ob- 
served in the 1980s. 
5.2.2  Measuring Inequality 
Changes in income inequality are usually described by changes in a scalar 
measure of inequality such as the Gini or the Theil index. A scalar measure 
completely ranks a set of income distributions in terms of increasing inequal- 
ity, but alternative scalar measures do not necessarily rank a set of distributions 
in the same way. We lessen this problem by using six different measures. 
The Lorenz curve, L(p),  shows the share of the total income that is appro- 
priated by the poorest p% of the population and is defined as 
for 0 5  p 5 I.  F is the cumulative distribution of the random variable Z, which 
represents labor earnings, and  c~ is the mean of Z.  Figure 5.4 illustrates the 
behavior of the Lorenz curves. The continuous line represents income distribu- 
tion in the early 1980s. In 1990 the Lorenz curve shifts out as inequality in- 
creases, and in 1991 it shifts in as inequality decreases. 
Based on the Lorenz curve, we can estimate a second measure of inequality: 
the relation between the income share of the richest 10% of the population and 
the income share of the poorest 40%. We call this measure the spread, S. 
(2)  S  [I -  L(0.9)]/L(0.4) 
We also use the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality. The Gini coeffi- 
cient is defined as 
(3)  G  (1 -  2L(p))  dp.  I"' 159  Inflation and Unemployment as Determinants of Inequality in Brazil 
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Fig. 5.4  Lorenz curves, Brazil, 1980-91 
The next inequality measure is the Theil index, 7: defined as 
(4)  T =  E[(Z/p)  ln(Z/p)], 
where E is the expectation operator, and Z has already been defined as a ran- 
dom variable representing labor  earning^.^ 
Inspection of monthly estimates for the spread, the Gini coefficient, and the 
Theil index, from January 1980 to December 1991, indicates the presence of 
outliers. We consider as outliers any estimate that diverges from the mean by 
more than two standard deviations. Since outliers can strongly influence our 
empirical analysis, we discarded them. The identification of outliers was done 
for each metropolitan area separately. Having identified an outlier, all inequal- 
ity measures for that point in time and metropolitan area were discarded. 
Next we decompose inequality.'O The objective of the decomposition is to 
isolate the contribution of changes associated with education from all other 
sources of change in inequality. We divide the population in each metropolitan 
region into five subgroups. In each of these subgroups, all workers have the 
same level of education according to the number of completed years of school- 
ing: less than one, one to four (elementary school), five to eight, nine to eleven, 
and twelve or more years. Based on this division we compute a measure of the 
average income inequality within groups, I, defined as 
(5) 
9. Monthly estimates for the spread, the Gini coefficient, and the Theil index for the six largest 
metropolitan areas of Brazil are available upon request. 
10. The variables used in the decomposition analysis spread over the period May  1982 and 
December 199  1, because the surveys do not cover information on the level of education of workers 
before May 1982. 160  Eliana Cardoso, Ricardo Paes de Barros, and Andre Urani 
where  is the inequality within subgroup i as measured by the Theil index; 
{a,}  is a system of weights, a, 2 0 and xa,  = 1. 
The measure of inequality within groups, I, can change either because the 
inequality within  groups, {Wz]  has changed  or because the  weights,  {a,], 
have changed. Because we do not want our measure I to be affected by changes 
in the distribution of the population by educational level, we define the weight 
of each subgroup i as the average of the 1980-91  shares in total population in 
each metropolitan  area. Therefore, the weights are constant, and only varia- 
tions in  { m)  can affect the measure of inequality within groups, I. 
The measure of the inequality between groups, B, is defined as 
(6)  BET-I. 
Figure 5.5 shows the twelve-month moving average of the Gini coefficient 
for the largest metropolitan  areas between January 1980 and December  199  1. 
The degree of inequality is smallest in Siio Paulo, followed by Rio de Janeiro. 
The extent  of  inequality  is  very  similar  in  Belo  Horizonte,  Salvador,  and 
Recife. 
Despite some regional nuances in the temporal pattern of inequality, all re- 
gions followed the same broad  pattern  summarized in table 5.4. During the 
first half of the  1980s, the degree of inequality oscillates around a high level. 
After  1984, inequality  first  goes  down  with  a trough  around  mid-1987.  It 
reaches a peak around mid- 1990 (with the Gini coefficient exceeding 0.62 in 
Belo Horizonte, Recife, Rio de Janeiro, and Salvador). After that it declines: 
at the end of 199 1 the degree of inequality was smaller than the minimal level 
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Table 5.4  Inequality Indices: Twelve-Month Average for Six Metropolitan 
Areas, 1981-91 


































reached during the 1980s (the average for the six metropolitan areas was 0.56 
in 1991). 
The temporal pattern for the other inequality indicators (the Theil index and 
the spread) follow a very similar pattern. The appendix table 5A.1 shows the 
high degree of correlation between the different inequality indicators for each 
metropolitan region. 
5.3  The Empirical Evidence 
5.3.1  Sources of  Inequality 
We believe that education has an important role in determining inequality 
but  that it cannot explain the cyclical pattern  followed by  inequality in the 
1980s. To determine whether education contributed to the cyclical pattern of 
the degree of income inequality in the 1980s, we compare the temporal evolu- 
tion of the Theil index,  with the temporal evolution for the average inequal- 
ity within  groups, I.  By construction,  I is not affected by changes either in 
the educational composition of the labor force or in the wage differentials by 
education level. Hence, if I  and T follow the same pattern, we can say that the 
events affecting the evolution of the inequality in the 1980s are unrelated to 
changes associated with education. 
We begin by investigating the temporal evolution of the average inequality 
within groups, I, and the inequality between groups, B. We can do this only 
after March 1982, when questions on education were introduced in the PME 
questionnaire. Both I and B behave similarly across regions, and we can thus 
concentrate our discussion on the average across regions." 
11, Monthly estimates of the two components of the Theil measure for each of the six metropoli- 
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Figure 5.1 shows the temporal evolution of {he average across metropolitan 
areas of the Theil index,  of the index of inequality within groups, Z, and of 
the index of  inequality between groups, B. Both the Theil index and the index 
for inequality within groups display the same cyclical pattern. In addition, the 
index for inequality within  groups shows a decreasing trend. On  the other 
hand, the index of  inequality between groups, B, displays almost no cyclical 
pattern and a clear increasing trend. 
In summary, the temporal pattern of the overall inequality can be decom- 
posed into three components: (1) a complete cycle from mid-1984 to the end 
of  1991 that is perfectly matched by the temporal evolution of  the inequality 
within group; (2) a decreasing trend in inequality caused by a decline in the 
Theil within groups; and (3) an upward trend in inequality caused by  an in- 
crease in the inequality between groups. As a result, from mid-1982 to the end 
of  1991, the overall inequality went through a complete cycle with a slightly 
decreasing trend. 
A consequence of  the opposite trends in inequality within groups and in- 
equality between groups is an increase in the power of explanation of educa- 
tion to account for the level of inequality at a point in time. We  can measure 
the “explanatory power of  education” by the ratio between the indices of  in- 
equality between and within groups, BII. This ratio increases over the period. 
Therefore, over the 1980s, even though education does not explain the varia- 
tions in inequality during the period, the static relationship between education 
and the level of the overall inequality in 1991 is even stronger than in 1982. 
We  also use an alternative procedure to investigate the relative contribution 
of  education to the cyclical fluctuations in inequality. We  first identify four 
periods, which are characterized by relatively big or small inequality: July 
1982 to June 1983 (big); July 1986 to June 1987 (small); January 1990 to June 
1990 (big); July  1991 to December 1991 (small). Then we decompose the 
change in overall inequality between each of these periods in two components: 
a  change in inequality within  groups and  a change in  inequality between 
groups. Table 5.5 shows that the decline in inequality between 1982-83  and 
1986-87  is almost entirely explained by a decline in inequality within groups. 
The increase in inequality between 1986-87  and 1990 is explained by  an in- 
crease in inequality in both indices of  inequality. Finally, the decline in in- 
equality between 1990 and 1991 is fully explained by the variation in inequal- 
ity within groups. 
Estimates by metropolitan area (in the appendix tables) corroborate that for 
Table 5.5  Decomposing the Variation in Inequality (average of all metropolitan 
areas) 
~ 
To  AT  AIIAT  ABIAT 
July 82-June  83  July 86-June  87  -0.053  0.94  0.06 
July 86-June  87  Jan. 90-June  90  0.102  0.50  0.50 
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Fig. 5.6  Unemployment rate in largest metropolitan areas, Brazil, 1980-91 
Nofes: Twelve-month moving averages. For definitions of  abbreviations, see note to 
fig. 5.5. 
all areas the within component contributes more than the index for inequality 
between groups to the decline in inequality from 1982-83  to  1986-87  and 
from 1990 to 1991. The results are mixed for the period in which inequality 
increases. In Belo Horizonte and Recife the between component accounts for 
the major part of  the increase in inequality; in Salvador both components ac- 
count equally for the change in inequality; in Rio de Janeiro the within compo- 
nent accounts for the major part of the change in the overall level of inequality. 
Having argued that the cyclical pattern followed by the level of the income 
inequality in Brazil is unrelated to changes associated with education, we turn 
to the analysis of unemployment and inflation. 
5.3.2  Unemployment and Inflation as Determinants of Inequality 
We first describe the evolution of inflation and unemployment in the 1980s. 
The inflation rates calculated from regional price indices are practically the 
same in all metropolitan areas. Between 1981 to mid-1983, the inflation rate 
was relatively stable at approximately 6%  per month (fig. 5.3). From mid-1983 
to the beginning of 1986, inflation doubled, it disappeared in March 1986 with 
the Cruzado Plan and returned at full speed in  1987, when it accelerated fast, 
reaching 40% per month in 1989. Inflation declined in 1990 to 15% per month. 
The evolution of the unemployment rate between 1980 and 1991 by metro- 
politan area is shown in figure 5.6.'* Recife has the highest unemployment 
rates and Rio de Janeiro the lowest. In  all metropolitan areas the unemploy- 
12. An  individual is defined as unemployed if he or she is ten or more years old and was not 
employed at  the time of  the interview but  was actively looking for a job in the week prior to 
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ment rates declined over the period. The decline was larger in Belo Horizonte 
and smaller in Silo Paulo. Overall the oscillation of unemployment during the 
period follows a similar pattern in all metropolitan areas. 
From 1980 to 1985 the unemployment rate went through two small cycles. 
It peaked at approximately 9% in the third quarter of  1981, declined to 6% in 
the third quarter of 1982, and increased to almost 8% in mid-1984. From mid- 
1984 to the end of  1986, there was a sharp decline in unemployment to less 
than 4%. Finally, from 1987 to 1991, the unemployment rate showed a slight 
increasing trend. 
The short-run fluctuations in unemployment in  the first half of  the  1980s 
and the sharp decline from  1985 to  1987 quite closely match variations in 
inequality. Hence, variations in the unemployment rate are promising explana- 
tions for the variations in inequality that occur before  1988. After  1988 the 
unemployment rate became stable, but the degree of inequality reveals sharp 
fluctuations. On the other hand, the inflation rate was stable in the first half of 
the 1980s, but fluctuated sharply in the second half of the 1980s and beginning 
of the 1990s, matching the fluctuations in the level of  inequality. Over the pe- 
riod 1980 to 1991, the combined behavior of unemployment and inflation can 
explain the oscillations of the degree of ineq~a1ity.I~ 
We now look at the results of the regression analysis. We have run two sets 
of regressions. In the first set we look at unemployment and inflation as deter- 
minants of inequality. In the second set we look at impact of unemployment 
and inflation on the real income of each educational group. 
In the first set, in each regression, our dependent variable is one of our in- 
equality indices. We ran each regression separately for each metropolitan area 
and inequality index. In each regression we used the raw monthly estimates 
for the inequality index. In the second set, in each regression, our dependent 
variable is the  logarithm of  the real  income of  one of  the  six educational 
groups. Again, we ran each regression separately for each metropolitan area. 
The independent variables are the level of the unemployment rate and the level 
of the inflation rate. We used the raw estimate of the unemployment rate. For 
the rate of inflation we used the average inflation of the previous year.I4 
Table 5.6 presents the coefficient of determination, R2,  of the eighteen re- 
13. The period of  fast increase in inflation (January 1987 to March 1990) coincides with the 
period of sharp increase in the inequality between educational groups (there is a strong correlation 
between the inequality between groups and the rate of inflation). One could argue that high rates 
of inflation increase the differentials in average wages between educational groups because the 
more educated groups are able to protect themselves better through more complete indexation. 
This conclusion is not warranted, because the decline in inflation in 1990 does not reduce inequal- 
ity between groups. It does, however, reduce inequality within groups. 
14. Our search indicates that results are not sensitive to the use of raw monthly unemployment 
rates or of three-month, six-month, or twelve-month moving averages. On the other hand, results 
did improve when we used the previous year’s average inflation rate instead of the current infla- 
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Table 5.6  Coefficient of  Determination, R2:  Regressions of Inequality on 
Unemployment and Inflation 
Dependent Variable 
Metropolitan Area  Gini  Spread  Theil  N 
Port0 Alegre  0.35  0.33  0.16  131 
S5o Paulo  0.11  0.15  0.06  129 
Rio de Janeiro  0.33  0.32  0.32  126 
Belo Horizonte  0.34  0.37  0.32  126 
Salvador  0.30  0.24  0.37  117 
Recife  0.37  0.60  0.28  I27 
Note:  Metropolitan areas are ordered from south to north. 
gressions where the independent variable is a measure of inequality. The coef- 
ficient of determination of the regressions of real income is in table 5.7. 
Table 5.6 shows that, except for SBo Paulo, variations in unemployment and 
inflation can explain approximately  one-third of all variation  in the level of 
inequality. This is an impressive result, given that our dependent variable is the 
raw monthly estimates of inequality, which include quite erratic variations, and 
we have not used any dummies to capture changes in government wage pol- 
icies. 
Table 5.8 shows the estimated coefficient on unemployment in the regres- 
sions of inequality. All coefficients are positive, and almost all of them have t- 
statistics above 2. Therefore they corroborate the hypothesis that inequality 
increases with unemployment. 
The regressions of real income of each educational group show that unem- 
ployment affects all groups negatively (table 5.9). Unemployment reduces the 
real income of the group with less than one year of education more strongly 
than the income of other groups in SPo Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, 
and Salvador. Unemployment does not affect the real income of the group with 
more than twelve years of education in Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte.ls 
Table 5.10 shows the estimated coefficients on inflation and their t-statistics 
of the regressions of  inequality. Except for inequality within groups in  SPo 
Paulo and Recife (where the t-statistics are small), all other coefficients are 
positive and have large t-statistics. They corroborate the hypothesis that infla- 
tion has an adverse effect on distribution. 
These results are supported by regressions for the real income by education 
15. Katz and Ravenga (1989) argue that the education-related wage differential is less likely to 
grow in very tight labor markets; that is, unemployment increases inequality between educational 
groups. Our evidence does not support this hypothesis. Unemployment does increase inequality 
within groups but does not affect inequality between groups. The coefficient on unemployment of 
regressions of  inequality between groups actually has a negative coefficient (but t-statistics are 
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Table 5.7  Coefficient of Determination, R2: Regressions of Real Incomes on 
Unemployment and Inflation (N  in each regression = 116) 
Years of Education 
Metropolitan Area  Less than  1  1 to 4  5 to 8  9to  II  I2 or More 
Porto Alegre  0.22  0.3  1  0.37  0.19  0.23 
Sb  Paulo  0.25  0.30  0.26  0.25  0.20 
Rio de Janeiro  0.26  0.14  0.33  0.20  0.07 
Belo Horizonte  0.3  1  0.35  0.36  0.27  0.13 
Salvador  0.35  0.44  0.44  0.39  0.27 
Recife  0.07  0.34  0.33  0.3  1  0.13 
Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of  the real income of  the group with the given 
years of education. Metropolitan areas are ordered from south to north. 
Table 5.8  Coefficient on Unemployment in Regressions of Inequality 
Dependent Variable 
Metropolitan Area  Gini  Spread  Theil 
Porto Alegre  0.13 
(2.0) 
SIo Paulo  0.23 
(3.8) 
Rio de Janeiro  0.48 
(6.8) 
Belo Horizonte  0.4  I 
(7.1) 
Salvador  0.50 
(4.6) 


























Nures: Metropolitan areas are ordered from south to north. The numbers in parentheses are 
t-statistics. 
differentials in table 5.1  1. These regressions show that inflation adversely af- 
fects the real income of all educational groups, but it particularly affects the 
real income of  the group in the middle (five to eight years of education, col- 
umn 3). 
Regressions of relative earnings, not reported in this paper, show that unem- 
ployment reduces earnings of the two groups that have less than five years of 
schooling relative to earnings of any of the three groups with more than five 
years of schooling. They also show that inflation reduces earnings of the group 
with five to eight years of schooling relative to any of the other groups. More- 
over, although inflation reduces real earnings of the group that has more than 
twelve years of  schooling,  it increases earnings of  this group relative to all 167  Inflation and Unemployment as Determinants of Inequality in Brazil 
other groups. This supports the view that the better-educated groups are able 
to obtain more perfect indexation than other groups. 
5.4  Conclusions 
Using monthly data for the six largest metropolitan areas of Brazil, this pa- 
per shows that education cannot explain the evolution of  inequality  in the 
198Os, which increased  with unemployment  and inflation. Despite regional 
features in the temporal pattern of inequality, inequality in all regions remained 
Table 5.9  Coefficient on Unemployment in Regressions of Real Incomes 
Metropolitan Area  Less than 1  1 to 4  5 to 8  9 to 11  12 or More 
~ 
Porto Alegre  -2.24 
(- 1.6) 
SIo Paulo  -3.87 
(-3.3) 
Rio de Janeiro  -2.29 
(-2.3) 
Belo Horizonte  -4.11 
(-4.8) 
Salvador  -3.74 
(-2.1) 


















































Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the real income of the group with the given years 
of education. Metropolitan areas are ordered from south to north. The numbers in parentheses are 
t-statistics. 
Table 5.10  Coefficient on Inflation in Regressions of Inequality 
Dependent Variable 
Metropolitan Area  Gini  Spread  Theil 
Porto Alegre  0.10 
(8.0) 
S%o  Paulo  0.02 
(1 3) 
Rio de Janeiro  0.13 
(6.9) 
Belo Horizonte  0.08 
(6.4) 
Salvador  0.11 
(6.3) 


























Notes: Metropolitan areas are ordered from south to north. The numbers in parentheses are 
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Table 5.11  Coefficient on Inflation in Regressions of Real Incomes 
Years of  Education 
Metropolitan Area  Less than 1  1 to4  5 to 8  9 to 11  12 or More 
Port0 Alegre  -1.33 
(-5.5) 
Slo Paulo  -1.11 
(-5.7) 
Rio de Janeiro  -0.99 
(-6.2) 
Belo Horizonte  -1.16 
(-6.6) 
Salvador  -  1.78 
(-7.1) 
Recife  -0.68 
(-2.7) 
















-  1.23 
(-6.1) 






























Notes: The dependent variable is the logarithm of the real income of the group with the given years 
of education. Metropolitan areas are ordered from south to north. The numbers in parentheses are 
t-statistics. 
relatively high and stable over the first half of the 1980s and moved cyclically 
thereafter. Inequality reached a bottom in the middle of  1987, peaked in the 
middle of 1990, and declined in  1991. 
We  divide the population into five groups. The active labor force in each 
group has the same level of education. We measure the inequality within and 
between groups, and we decompose the temporal pattern of inequality in the 
1980s into three components: a complete cycle from the middle of  1984 to the 
end of  1991, which is perfectly matched by the evolution of the within group 
component of the inequality; a decreasing trend in inequality within groups; 
and an upward trend in inequality between groups. 
Having shown that the cyclical pattern followed by the level of  the income 
inequality is unrelated to changes associated with education, we argue that the 
opposite trends of  the two components of  inequality  increase the power of 
differentials in education to explain the level of inequality in  1991 relative to 
1982. (The ratio between the index of  inequality between groups divided by 
the index of inequality within groups rises over the period.) 
Moreover, we show that variations in unemployment and inflation can ex- 
plain approximately one-third of  all variation in the level of inequality in all 
metropolitan areas, except Sgo Paulo. Furthermore, inflation reduces the real 
incomes of all educational groups but affects more strongly the group in the 
middle (with five to eight years of education). 
Our results support the hypotheses that unemployment increases inequality 
and that inflation widens  inequality  by  pushing the middle-income groups 
into poverty. 169  Inflation and Unemployment as Determinants of Inequality in Brazil 
Appendix 
Data Sources and Description 
Here we describe the data and the universe we used. 
Information on the consumer price index in each metropolitan area was ob- 
tained from the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE, the Bra- 
zilian census bureau). The consumer price indices for Sgo Paulo, Rio de Ja- 
neiro, and  Belo Horizonte  are also published  in  FundaqZo Getulio Vargas, 
Conjuntura Economica, Rio de Janeiro, various issues. 
Information on labor income, the unemployment rate, and the income differ- 
entials by educational level was obtained from the Pesquisa Mensal de Em- 
prego (PME), a monthly employment survey conducted by the Instituto Brasi- 
leiro de Geografia e Estatistica. The survey exists since 1980  for the six largest 
Brazilian metropolitan areas. Ordered from south to north they are Porto Ale- 
gre, SZo Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, and Recife. In 1982, 
the PME was evaluated and revised, leading to several improvements, in partic- 
ular the inclusion of questions on the education level of workers. 
Each month, approximately 10,OOO workers, ten or more years old, are inter- 
viewed in  each metropolitan  area. The PME asks each  sampled  individual 
nineteen questions about his or her individual characteristics and the nature of 
his or her position in the labor market. For each individual in the sample we 
use the information on whether the individual was employed or not at the time 
of the interview. For those who were employed we also use the information on 
the labor income actually received in the previous month in his or her primary 
occupation, and his or her education level. For those who were not employed 
we use the information on whether or not they were actively looking for a job 
during the week prior to the interview. 
The analysis is conducted separately for each metropolitan area. For each 
month between January 1980 and December 1991 and each metropolitan area, 
we compute the unemployment rate and different measures of income inequal- 
ity. The universe of analysis is the employed population ten or more years old, 
and the concept of earnings is labor earnings actually received in the previous 
month in the primary occupation. 
Table 5A.1  Correlation between Inequality Indices 
Metropolitan Area  Theil-Gini  Gini-Spread  Theil-Spread 
Porto AIegre  0.84  0.97  0.76 
Siio Paul0  0.77  0.98  0.68 
Rio de Janeiro  0.90  0.98  0.84 
Belo Horizonte  0.85  0.95  0.73 
Salvador  0.92  0.94  0.83 
Recife  0.91  0.84  0.65 
Note; Metropolitan areas are ordered from south to north. 170  Eliana Cardoso, Ricardo Paes de Barros, and Andre Urani 
Table 5A.2  Decomposing the Variation in Inequality 
From  To  AT  AllAT  ABIAT 
SBo Paulo  July 82-June  83 
July 86-June  87 
Jan. 90-June  90 
July 82-June  83 
July 86-June  87 
Jan. 90-June  90 
Belo Horizonte  July 82-June  83 
July 86-June  87 
Jan. 90-June  90 
Salvador  July 82-June  83 
July 86-June  87 
Jan. 90-June  90 
Recife  July 82-June  83 
July 86-June  87 
Jan. 90-June  90 
Rio de Janeiro 
July 86-June  87 
Jan. 90-June  90 
July 91-Dec.  91 
July 86-June  87 
Jan. 90-June  90 
July 91-Dec.  91 
July 86-June  87 
Jan. 90-June  90 
July 9 I-Dec.  9  I 
July 86-June  87 
Jan. 90-June  90 
July 91-Dec.  91 
July 86-June  87 
Jan. 90-June  90 
















0.62  0.38 
-  I .46  2.46 
0.95  0.05 
0.93  0.07 
0.96  0.04 
1.03  0.10 
0.74  0.26 
0.19  0.8  I 
0.82  0.18 
1.16  -0.16 
0.54  0.46 
2.01  -1.01 
1.03  -0.03 
0.28  0.72 
0.62  0.38 
Table 5A.3  Regressions of Inequality within and between Groups 
~~ 
Inequality within Groups  Inequality between Groups 
Coefficient  Coefficient 
Coefficient on  on  Coefficient on  on 
Metropolitan Area  N  R2  Unemployment  Inflation  R2  Unemployment  Inflation 
Port0 Alegre  115  0.08  0.67 
(3.0) 
SZo Paulo  113  0.08  0.43 
(2.6) 
Rio de Janeiro  110  0.28  1.69 
(6.3) 
Belo Horizonte  113  0.18  1.18 
(5.0) 
Salvador  110  0.13  1.35 
(3.6) 














0.36  -0.44 
(-2.7) 
0.20  -0.01 
(-0.1) 
0.27  -0.06 
(-0.3) 
0.38  -0.05 
(-0.3) 
0.31  -0.11 
(-0.4) 














Nore; The numbers in parentheses are r-statistics. 
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Comment  Rubens Ricupero 
In the early  197Os, Nixon  put in a nutshell the conventional wisdom of the 
time when he said that, “as Brazil goes, so goes Latin America.” The so-called 
Brazilian  economic miracle  led  observers-with  a  few  worthy  exceptions, 
such as Professor Albert Fishlow-to  overlook the increasing inequality, the 
absence of democracy, and the violation of human rights. 
Twenty years later, another cliche stubbornly clings to descriptions of the 
current Brazilian situation. Once again, economic performance is given pre- 
eminence, but the new, reverse clicht risks glossing over other relevant aspects 
of our reality. 
The purpose of this seminar is precisely to probe clichts and stereotypes in 
an attempt to grasp-to  the extent possible-the  diversity and contradictori- 
ness of Brazil’s overall situation today. 
This is perhaps too ambitious a goal for only one day of discussions, but we 
can at least broach the subject by pointing out a few issues worthy of consider- 
ation. 
First, there is a risk of excessive absorption in the short term. Among the ten 
largest economies in the world, Brazil’s was the one that grew the most in the 
117-year period between  1870 and  1987. The 1986 and 1987 Interamerican 
Development Bank and ECLAC reports still stressed that it was Brazil’s growth 
during that period that kept the Latin American  average growth from being 
negative.  Those  who  still  remember  how  quick  was  the  transition  from 
Europessimism  to Europhoria  or that only twenty-four  months  separate the 
1989 annus mirabilis from the 1992 annus horribilis should resist the tempta- 
tion of drawing too definitive conclusions about the present. 
Second, it should be recalled  that although  we share Latin America’s cir- 
cumstances-an  inescapable  frame of reference-some  peculiar features of 
the Brazilian situation make it impossible to fit it into a continental typology. 
In my view, three of these features stand out as differentiating elements be- 
tween the Brazilian situation and that of the rest of Latin America, namely, the 
centrality of the political and institutional crisis, the significance of regional 
problems, and the implications of size. 
Other Latin American countries may experience dramatic conflicts, guerril- 
las, and coups and attempted coups, as we recently saw in Venezuela and Peru. 
But none of them is seriously considering the adoption of parliamentarism, as 
Brazil is getting ready to do in six months’ time. None has undertaken  such 
an extensive and ambitious process of overhauling its constitution  as Brazil. 
Argentina did not change its 1853 constitution after the military regime, while 
Chile opted for approving a constitutional  amendment before transition-in 
Rubens Ricupero is the minister of  finance of  Brazil. He was the coordinator of  the Contact 
Group on  Finances at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de 
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both instances the extent and the destabilizing effects of the changes were kept 
within strict boundaries. 
Pronounced regional contrasts and tensions and, more important, the degree 
of power and autonomy enjoyed by  some states and municipalities are other 
characteristics setting Brazil apart from the prevailing Latin American pattern. 
Only recently did the Colombian and Venezuelan governments relinquish the 
practice of appointing provincial governors and accepted that they should be 
chosen through  direct elections. In other countries,  federalism  is of a mild, 
loose variety  as compared to Brazil’s. One of  the military regime’s mentors 
used to say that Brazilian history could be defined as the alternation between 
centralization  and decentralization  or, in his characteristic  prose, by  systole 
and diastole. This issue has now reached a critical point, for it not only fuels 
the increasingly hot debate on popular representation in the Chamber of Depu- 
ties but also raises one of the most delicate issues concerning fiscal and eco- 
nomic adjustment, owing.to the resistance to any change in the incentive sys- 
tem and in the current tax revenue sharing system. 
In essence, this is one of the manifestations  of  another of Brazil’s distin- 
guishing features: the gigantic size of a territory physically difficult to control 
and to exploit and a population  equivalent to that of Russia, a great part of 
which  concentrated  in  megalopolises  whose  administration  constitutes  a 
greater challenge than governing any of several smaller nations on the conti- 
nent.  Problems pertaining  to territory and population  combine to put Brazil 
more appropriately in the same category as Russia, China, and India than in 
one class with Argentina,  Chile, and Venezuela.  This inevitably affects the 
prospects for foreign policy and of integration with the world economy. 
Such a rich and dynamic picture as that presented by Brazil today necessar- 
ily allows different but also seemingly contradictory  readings. For example, 
many see the impeachment procedure under way against President Collor as 
just one more manifestation  of  the failure of  a fragmented political  system 
incapable of producing consensus and acceptable standards of administrative 
ethics; others, however, commend the lack of violence, the military’s exem- 
plary conduct, and the sanctioning of the removal of an incumbent president 
on grounds of corruption as evidence of the renewed vigor and effectiveness 
of democratic institutions and the civilian society. 
As a further illustration of this diversity of possible interpretations, consider 
first an article by Jorge Castafieda in El Pais (September 24, 1992), sugges- 
tively  entitled  “El  ejemplo brasilefio”  (The Brazilian  example). The article 
starts with the prevailing negative approach: “From this perspective, the misap- 
propriation of public funds. . . would represent but a further trauma, in contrast 
to the current success achieved by  Mexico, Chile and Argentina. Differently 
from these fortunate nations,  Brazilians  would  have been humiliated  by the 
unexpected fall of a frivolous president, caused by the proverbial failure of  a 
paralyzed political system-the  whole made worse by the abandonment of the 
attempt to carry out the ultimate  economic reform.” But, after outlining  the 174  Eliana Cardoso, Ricardo Paes de Barros, and Andre Urani 
widespread corruption problem on the Latin American continent and pointing 
out the failure in combating it, the author chooses another interpretation, stat- 
ing that “Brazil’s serious crisis can also be viewed differently as a real water- 
shed in Latin American politics, as the first time in history  when corruption 
. . .  is finally going to be punished instead of rewarded. It can also be taken as 
a herald of future developments, to the extent that the Brazilian scandal sets a 
precedent  and an  example  to be  followed.”  Castaiieda goes  on  to say that 
“never before had the very institutions that raised someone to power turned 
against him and finally removed him from the Presidential Office.” And he 
concludes that “Fernando Collor’s likely impeachment is by no means a symp- 
tom of weakness in Brazilian politics, nor is it a result of  the so often com- 
mented paralysis of the political system. On the contrary, it is evidence of the 
strength and viability of both Brazilian politics and the Brazilian political sys- 
tem as well as the logical outcome of underlying, contradictory, often decisive 
political trends.” One of these trends is the “process of democratization of Bra- 
zilian  politics  in  the  past  decade.  The  sturdiness  of  civilian  society-the 
strength of the church and the political parties, of the press and the unions, of 
women and students, of environmentalists and the Congress-has  made Brazil 
a singular case in Latin America.” 
An example of that same reading is another article in El Pais (September 1, 
1992),  written by Alain Touraine and entitled “La crisis brasileiia” (The  Bruzil- 
iun crisis);  the author states that “this painful crisis deepens the misery felt by 
many, but Brazil’s outlook remains very positive. Brazil was not an underdevel- 
oped  country making progress, but a poor developed country, as it already 
possessed all the elements of a modern society: investment capability, entrepre- 
neurship, technical capacity, social negotiation forces, and a very rich intellec- 
tual and cultural environment. Brazil was the last country on the continent to 
complete  the liberal revolution  but  it will  be the first to rebuild  itself  and 
to forge ahead  within  the  framework  of a modern  economy,  owing  above 
all to the  soundness of  its  social agents,” the latter of  which,  according to 
Touraine, find a parallel only in Chile. 
What is under discussion is not the Brazilian reality. There is no denying 
that failures in recent years owe a great deal to the fragmentation of the politi- 
cal system and to insufficient political craftsmanship. This recognition, how- 
ever, does not advance much further our understanding of why this is occurring 
now instead of at other moments of our past. 
The articles quoted might offer a clue to a possible explanation. After the 
military regime came to an end, it could be said that Brazil not only began a 
transition to a civilian form of government, or a change from a semiautarkic to 
a more open and market-oriented economy. Far beyond that, a process of pro- 
found social change was taking place, subjecting the political system to un- 
precedented pressures and disturbances. Such a process of social democratiza- 
tion boosts the number of players, exacerbates class and regional conflicts, and 
intensifies the awareness of disparities, thereby malung consensus more diffi- 
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The scale of this process of change should not be underestimated. A country 
that started the nineteenth century with a population consisting of 1.3 million 
free whites and 3.9 million  blacks, mostly  slaves, and entered the twentieth 
century with a life expectancy of slightly over thirty years, Brazil now offers a 
scene in which a blue-collar worker and a black woman from the fuvelus had 
a real change of being elected president of the Republic and mayor of Rio de 
Janeiro, respectively. One might ask, in which countries in Latin America or 
in the Western world would such situations be a realistic possibility? 
This kind of process does not occur in an orderly, Cartesian, rational man- 
ner-as  the  legend  “Order  and  Progress”  on  our  flag portends:  rather,  its 
course is often destabilizing and unpredictable. Some academic analysts might 
prefer a strictly controlled process conducted by a small promodernization elite 
in the Atatiirk model or, to take up a new fashionable term, a sequencing after 
the Asian model, in which economic modernization precedes political partici- 
pation. Whatever the merit of these approaches, this kind of debate is irrelevant 
in Brazil’s case, as history has clearly chosen to embark on a complex course, 
in which political and social democratization coincides with the economic sta- 
bilization and modernization effort. 
Among the successful development models cited for comparison purposes, 
some countries have achieved economic adjustment under an authoritarian re- 
gime and have maintained it under a democratic form of government but have 
yet been unable to settle the inherited social debt. Others, which are carrying 
out an exemplary modernization task from a technocratic point of view, enjoy 
a high degree of social control and are not overly disturbed by the unions and 
the press,  nor by  a vigorous, autonomous  legislature or judiciary.  In others, 
economic  indices  are  encouraging,  but  popular  dissatisfaction  with  poor 
wealth distribution, the persistence of corruption, and the weakness of the judi- 
ciary system or the press raise doubts and fuel uncertainty about the results. 
To prove that  far-reaching  political and  social democratization based  on 
sound institutions is capable of engendering the consensus needed to effect 
and maintain  economic adjustment and ensure the proper distribution of  its 
benefits is a challenge that has never been fully met-not  in Brazil, in Latin 
America, or anywhere else in the developing world. This Page Intentionally Left Blank